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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to a
letter dated July 8, 1987, from the Clerk of the Utah Supreme
Court, delegating this case to this Court.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal and cross-appeal from findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and judgment entered in a civil action in the
Third Judicial District Court by the Honorable Scott Daniels on
March 20, 1987.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

When

the

Trial

Judge

enters

Findings

of

Fact and

Conclusions of Law which have been discussed, reviewed, modified,
and then approved by attorneys for both parties, may one of those
parties then file an appeal based upon a challenge to those very
Findings without marshalling all of the evidence supporting the
Trial Court's Findings and then demonstrating why those findings
should not be accorded the presumption in favor of their being
sustained?
2.

Should this Court reverse or alter the trial courtfs

findings of fact which are supported by competent and substantial
evidence in the record?
3.

Assuming that the trial court's findings of fact in
4

this case are supported by substantial and competent evidence in
the record, are the conclusions of law founded thereon justified
and consistent with other law?
4.

With respect to Plaintiff-Respondent

Monroe's cross-

appeal, does the Utah Unlawful Detainer statute (Utah Code §§7836-10 (2) and

(3)) required that the damages incurred by the

property owner be trebled?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND OTHER PROVISIONS

The following are determinative

regulation and statutory

provisions:
29 C.F.R. §785.23:
Employees residing on employer's premises or working at
home.
An employee who resides on his employer's
premises on a permanent basis or for extended
periods of time is not considered as working
all the time he is on the premises.
Ordinarily, he may engage in normal private
pursuits and thus have enough time for
eating, sleeping, entertaining, and other
periods of complete freedom from all duties
when he may leave the premises for purposes
of his own.
It is of course difficult to
determine the exact hours worked under these
circumstances and any reasonable agreement of
the parties which takes into consideration
all of the pertinent facts will be accepted.
This rule would apply, for example, to the
pumper of a stripper well who resides on the
premises of his employer and also to a
telephone operator who has the switchboard in
her own home. Skelly Oil Co. v. Jackson, 194
Okla. 183, 148. P.2d 182 (Okla. Sup. Ct.
1944); Thompson v. Loring Oil Co.., 50 F.
5

Supp. 213 (W.D.La. 1943)

Utah Code
78-36-10 (2) and (3).
(2)
The jury, or the court, if the
proceeding is tried without a jury or upon
the defendant's default, shall also assess
the damages resulting to the plaintiff from
any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; (c) waste
of the premises during defendant's tenancy,
if waste is alleged in the complaint and
proved at trial; and (d) the amount of rent
due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is
after default in the payment of rent.
(3)
The judgment shall be entered against
the defendant for the rent, for three times
the amount of the damages assessed under
Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c), and for
reasonable attorneysfs fees, if they are
provided for in the lease or agreement.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
This action was initially commenced in the Circuit Court by
Plaintiff-Respondent

Monroe, Inc. (hereinafter

referred

to as

"Monroe"), as an unlawful detainer action, seeking to evict the
Defendant-Appellant (hereinafter, "Sidwell"), whose employment as
a security person for Monroe had been terminated several months
earlier.
A petition for an order of restitution in favor of Monroe
was filed.

Sidwell filed an answer, asserting that Monroe had

harassed her and caused her $515,000.00 in general and punitive
damages.

The case was transferred to the District Court.

pursued the order of restitution, which was granted.

Monroe
Sidwell

then filed an amended answer and counterclaim against Monroe,

asserting a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
§201, et seq. ("FLSA"), and seeking approximately $100,000.00 in
damages.
Course of the Proceedings:
The case was set for trial before the Honorable Judge Scott
Daniels, who tried the matter without a jury on March 2 and 3,
1987.

At

the close of

the evidence

and after hearing the

arguments of counsel, Judge Daniels ruled in favor of Monroe and
against Sidwell and directed Monroe's counsel to prepare an order
and

submit

it

after

approval as to form.

presenting

it

to opposing

counsel

for

Transcript of Proceedings (included in the

Record at page 224 and referred

to herein as "Tr.") 300-03.

Monroe submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
to which Sidwell objected.

After informal consultation between

counsel, a second revised set of proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law were submitted.
204-07.

Again, Sidwell objected.

R.

Sidwell submitted her own proposed supplemental findings

and conclusions.

R. 208-11.

Judge Daniels held a conference to

review the submissions by both counsel during which conference
the attorneys agreed as to the wording which would be used in the
final version of the findings and conclusions.

See Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law attached as a part of the Appendix to
Sidwell's Brief.
After entry of the Judgment on March 20, 1987, Sidwell filed
a notice of appeal on April 17, 1987, alleging that the trial
court

erred

in denying

relief

for the asserted
7

FLSA claims.

R.212.

Monroe filed a cross appeal on April 27, 1987, asserting

that the trial court erred in not trebling the damages under the
initial unlawful detainer claim. R.214.

Disposition of Trial Court:
As indicated above, the Trial Court entered judgment in
favor of Monroe on the claim for unlawful detainer in the amount
of $300.

The Trial Court also entered judgment in favor of

Monroe and against Sidwell on the FLSA counterclaim.

R.202.

Relevant Facts:
The testimony in this case was conflicting at many points.
The Trial Court was required to weigh that testimony and make
factual determinations.

In setting forth the relevant facts in

this Brief, Monroe has taken the Findings of Fact as reviewed and
approved as to form by counsel and adopted by the Trial Court and
has

added

citations

to

the

Record

or

Transcript

of

the

Proceedings to show that Judge Daniels1 Findings were all based
upon the evidence before him.
citations

are

set

forth

These Findings and the supporting

in full because of

the Appellant's

attempt to ignore the material and relevant facts as found by the
Trial Court.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to the

Utah Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer Act, §§78-361 to 12.6, Utah Code Annotated.

Defendant answered and

asserted by way of counterclaim causes of action under
8

the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.
(hereinafter, the "FLSA").
2.
herein,

R.93-95; R.48-75.

At the time of the commencement of the action
plaintiff

was

a Delaware

corporation

doing

business in Utah and Idaho, with places of business in
Salt Lake County, Utah, among other places.
3.

Since at

least January,

1982, plaintiff's

yearly gross sales has exceeded $250,000.
4.

Tr. 300.

Tr. 300.

Defendant, M. Timmie Sidwell, is an individual

who was employed by plaintiff as a security person at
the plaintiff's

Cottonwood

Heights

sand

and

gravel

location in Salt Lake County from February 8, 1982,
through March 31, 1986.
5.

Tr. 106.

When defendant was hired, the plaintiff and

defendant agreed that she would be paid $355 per month
[Tr. 42] and would live in a mobile home located on the
premises

in a space provided by the plaintiff with

utilities [Tr.42-43; 163-64] (gas, electricity, water,
and septic tank [Ex. P-16]) furnished by the employer
as

further

consideration

for

her

services;

it was

understood that defendant would either rent or buy the
mobile home in which she lived [Tr. 42].
6.
purpose

In addition to residing on the premises, the
of

which

was

to

provide

a

presence

to

discourage and deter trespassers [Tr. 141; 158; 16667],

defendant

was

also

assigned
9

certain

specific

duties which included ensuring that the gates to the
property were locked [R.247], making one limited round
each week-day and an additional two rounds [R.248; Tr.
52;

Ex.

P-ll]

on weekends

and

holidays,

preparing

periodic reports [Tr. 180], and occasionally performing
other minor miscellaneous functions (including turning
a pump switch on [Tr. 166; R.247], and checking a pilot
light on windy days [R.272]) if she were available to
do so [Tr. 250]; defendant had no other specific duties
after daylight hours [Tr. 144; Ex. P-ll] or when other
Monroe personnel were on the premises [Tr. 143; 146;
161-62; Ex. P-ll]; other than her rounds, defendant was
not expected to keep any regular watch [Tr. 141; 146]
or surveillance over the property but was merely asked
to report any trespassing or vandalism which should
happen to come to her attention.
7.

Plaintiff and defendant agreed that defendant

would reside on the premises [Tr. 42], although it was
not a condition of her employment that she be present
on the premises on a full-time basis or during any
certain times [Tr. 141; 162; 250; 267; R.252] (except
to perform some of her specific duties, the timing of
some

of

which

assignments

was

freely

altered

by

defendant from time to time).
8.

On one occasion when defendant was absent from

the premises for several days, she arranged at her own
10

expense to have a another person live in the mobile
home while she was away, but there was no showing that
the duties of the other person were any different from
those of defendant during said period.
9.

R.265.

On the occasion referred to in Finding 8,

defendant's regular salary was paid without reduction.
10.

Defendant was free to come and go as she

wished [Tr. 141; 161; 246; 250; 267; R.252], and was
free to pursue her own individual interests during the
time she was employed by plaintiff and to use her time
effectively for her own purposes [Tr. 262] to do such
things as eat, sleep, go shopping, do personal errands,
study,
Symphony
during

write,
[Tr.
the

occasionally
221-22],

day

[Tr.

attend

accept
183],

church

full-time
and,

with

and

the

employment
the

prior

permission of the plaintiff (which was freely given and
never denied [Tr. 187, 260]), take evening classes at
the

University

occasion

for

of
two

Utah
or

[Tr. 165, 179] and

three months

accept

on one

full-time

employment which extended until approximately 9:00 p.m.
on week days

[Tr. 194], and engage in other normal

private pursuits.
11.

Defendant's actual duties under the agreement

with plaintiff approximated no more than eight to ten
hours per week [Tr. 54; 57; 151; 165; 254; R.248; Exs.
P-10, P-12] for which she was paid by plaintiff at
11

rates in excess of the minimum wage required under the
FLSA; and during the other times when defendant was
living on the premises, she was not on duty, and those
times did not constitute hours which were controlled or
required by the plaintiff or its business [Tr. 243;
250; 255; 262; 266-67].
12.

Under all of the circumstances of this case,

the plaintiff paid the defendant for her hours of work
at a rate which at all times exceeded the minimum rate
required by the FLSA [Tr. 255; 269].
13.

Plaintiff and its representatives did not act

in careless disregard of the minimum wage or overtime
compensation
intentionally,

provisions

of

knowingly,

action which violated

the
or

FLSA

and

voluntarily

did

not

take

any

the minimum wage or overtime

compensation provisions of the FLSA [Tr. 104; 119-20;
255; 263; 268; Ex. P-10].
14.

Plaintiff's representatives acted

in good

faith without being cognizant of any possible violation
of the minimum wage or overtime compensation provisions
of the FLSA [Tr. 119-20; 255; 263; 268; Ex. P-10].
15.

Defendant's

employment

was

terminated

by

notice dated January 28, 1986, to be effective March
31, 1986, said notice requesting that she vacate the
premises by the end of March, 1986 [Ex. P-14; and see
Tr. 44].
12

16.

When defendant failed to vacate by the stated

date, plaintiff caused that a notice to quit be served
upon her which was done on April 17, 1986 [R.6; Ex. P9].
17.

The complaint in this action was filed on April

25, 1986 [R.4], but defendant's mobile home was not removed
from plaintiff's property until October 30, 1986 [see Tr.
237] .
18.

The damages thus incurred by plaintiff total

$300.00, computed by

multiplying the reasonable rental

value of the mobile home space (which the Court finds,
after considering all the evidence [Tr. 302; 96], to be
$50.00 per month [Tr. 302]) times six months.
19.

Plaintiff offered evidence that in addition to the

reasonable

rental

value

of

the mobile

home

space, the

average monthly value of utilities provided for defendant
were gas: $30; electricity: $25; water $8; and sewer: $10
[Ex. P-16].

Summary of the Argument:
The Trial Court's rejection of Sidwell's FLSA claims was
proper.
In

the

This case is one which turns primarily on the facts.
preparation

attorneys

for

both

of

the

parties

Trial
gave

Court's
great

Findings
attention

of Fact,
to

those

Findings, working on several drafts before finally submitting an
approved version to the Trial Court for signature.
13

As indicated

in the Statement of Facts, above, each of the Trial Court's
findings is supported by substantial and competent evidence in
the record.

The Appellant Sidwell has failed to marshal the

evidence supporting the Trial Court's Findings and has also then
failed

to demonstrate why those Findings should be rejected.

This Court should not presume to retry the case on appeal, but
should

accept

those

supported

Findings

of

the Trial Court,

especially when the contents of those Findings were so carefully
considered and so strongly supported by the record.

The Findings

of Fact support the Conclusions of Law which the Trial Court also
adopted after careful consideration by the parties1 attorneys.
Existing

regulations and applicable

case

law serve as clear

precedent for the ultimate conclusions of the Trial Court.
The Trial Court did err, however, when he failed to treble
the

damages

sustained

by

detainer of the premises.

Monroe

due

to

Sidwellfs

unlawful

Utah law leaves no discretion for a

judge in this regard; he must treble damages incurred after the
notice in an unlawful detainer situation.

A R G U M E N T
I.

IF THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE SUPPORTED
IN THE RECORD, THEY MAY NOT BE SET ASIDE ON REVIEW.
A.

The Findings of Fact Which Were Adopted
by the Trial Court Are All Supported in the Record.

Monroe has incorporated verbatim all of the Trial Court's
Findings of Fact, adding citations to the Record for each point
14

and

subpoint.

See above.

This detailed approach has been

followed in this Brief because of the significance of those facts
to the outcome of this appeal.
show,

each

of

the

Trial

As those reproduced Findings

Court's

findings

is premised

upon

substantial and competent evidence in the Record.
Appellant Sidwell ignores that evidence and argues (Sidwell
Brief, pp. 14-16) that the Trial Court erroneously found that
Mrs. Sidwell was not required to be physically present at the
work site during any specified hours.

Attempting to support this

argument, Sidwell cites three Findings

(Nos. 7, 10, and 11),

emphasizing certain language from each, which Sidwell asserts are
contrary to the "clear weight of the evidence."

This argument

fails from the outset as the language of the Findings shows.
Sidwell's Brief points to the following passages as alleged
error (Brief, pp. 14-15):
From Finding No. 7:
it was not a condition of her
employment that she be present on the
premises on a full time basis or during any
certain times (except to perform some of her
specified duties, the timing of some of which
assignments was freely altered by Defendant
from time to time.
[Emphasis in Sidwell
Brief.]
From Finding No. 10:
Defendant was free to come and go as she
wished, . . . . [Emphasis in Sidwell Brief.]
From Finding No. 11:
Defendant's actual duties under the agreement
with Plaintiff approximated no more than
eight to ten hours per week . . . ; and the
other times when Defendant was living on the
15

premises did not constitute hours which were
controlled by the plaintiff or its business.
[Emphasis in Sidwell Brief.]
Despite

the portions emphasized

by Sidwell1s Brief, the

remainder of the foregoing passages clearly indicates that the
Trial Court found that some of Mrs. Sidwell's time was indeed
required on a regular basis.

The Trial Court found that she was

compensated for that time at lawful rates.

See Findings No. 11

and No. 12.
Sidwell's Brief, however, attempts to mislead the reader by
suggesting that the Trial Court did not recognize the fact that
some of Mrs. Sidwell's time was required on a regular basis.

The

misleading assertion is contained in the Brief at pp. 15-16:
These Findings and Conclusions are
erroneous for the following two reasons.
First, the clear weight of the evidence shows
that Defendant Sidwell was in fact required
to be physically present at the property
during certain specified hours during the
week. . . .
The Trial Court

found

(and Monroe does not dispute) that of

course Mrs. Sidwell was required to be present during certain
times.

This was never contested at the hearing and the Trial

Court adopted Findings so stating.
The effort in Sidwell's Brief to mislead is compounded in
that portion of the Brief which underscores only certain parts of
Findings 7, 10, and 11.
qualifying
incomplete.

The underscoring fails to include the

language, without which the Findings are obviously
For example, Sidwell's Brief does not emphasize the

words of Finding No. 7 which state that Mrs. Sidwell's presence
16

was not required during any certain times except to perform some
of her specific duties.
Sidwell

Also, in referring to Finding No. 11,

fails to emphasize that her actual duties under the

agreement with Monroe approximated no more than eight to ten
hours per week.
The

attempt

to mislead

is further

compounded

by other

statements in the Brief (at pp. 19, 26) which suggest that the
Trial Court did not find that Mrs. Sidwell!s "presence" around
her home was anticipated.

However, Findings 5, 6, and 7 each

make reference to the fact that when Mrs. Sidwell was hired she
was expected to live in the mobile home located on the Monroe
property.
Sidwellfs

Brief,

however,

doesn't

seem

to

contest

the

important Finding of the Trial Court that Mrs. Sidwell was not
required to be on the premises on a full-time basis.

Instead,

Sidwellfs Brief nit-picks the Findings, expecting this Court on
review to quibble over the degree of freedom which Mrs. Sidwell
enjoyed while living on the Monroe property.
In Sidwell's own proposed supplemental

findings, Sidwell

urged the Trial Court to hold that "during normal hours of plant
operation, Defendant [Sidwell] was completely free to come and go
as

she

wished,

and

was

free

to

pursue

her

own

individual

interests, including accepting full-time employment with another
employer and engaging

in other normal, private pursuits with

complete freedom from all duties or responsibilities."
10]

Thus, Appellant

in essence
17

accepted

some of

[R.209the very

Findings which she now wishes to contest.
In making his ruling with respect to the degree of freedom
enjoyed by Mrs. Sidwell, the Trial Court relied upon the Record,
which included the following statements (among others):
(Testimony of Stanton Wilson, Tr. 54)
Q [by Kennedy] Now, in this document [P-12,
which was written by Mrs. Sidwell herself],
did the Defendant [Sidwell] attempt to set
forth the amount of time that she spent on
active guard duties each week?
*

*

A Yes. Middle of the
about there—well, all
but it culminates there
says seven hours and 50

*

second page she talks
the way through it,
on in Category D, she
minutes.

(Testimony of Foreman Bruce Squires, Tr. 141-42)
Q [by Kennedy] What were those duties?
A Well, they would vary. There was no set
routine.
When she was hired, she was told
that what we really wanted on the premises
was her presence, someone coming and going so
there would be tire tracks in the snow and on
the weekends the kids would know there was
someone around because, you know Monroe had,
had a problem with, you know the kids on the
pond.
Q
Did you expect her to be there all the
time on the weekends?
A No. . . . And again, verbal, you know,
number of years ago—I mean, it was in 1980
or '82, I mean, but—and just told her she
needed to be there and that so there was a
presence that she was free to come and go as
she pleased.
Q

She was free as she pleased?

A

As she pleased.

Q

And you told her that?
18

A
Yes.
I also recall telling her that,
though, she is going to be gone, say a couple
of days, we would like to know about it. And
then I—or the foreman or someone could make
some trips down there occasionally, you know,
just to check. * * *
(Squires testimony, Tr. 151, 267)
Q [by Kennedy] Concerning what Mrs. Sidwell
had indicated as her active guard duties, how
many hours a week would you estimate would be
required in performing those active guard
duties that she defines in her memo [P-12]?
A

Five to ten, maybe.
*

*

*

Q
Mr. Squires, you've also been here and
heard Mrs. Sidwellfs testimony. Did you ever
place any restrictions on her coming and
going as a part of her job?
A

No, sir.

(Testimony of Foreman Darrell Williams, Tr. 162, 16465; R. 248, 252):
Q
[by Kennedy] Was it your understanding
that she was free to come and go as she
pleased?
A Yes.
Q And in fact, she did come and go as she
pleased, did she not, during the period of
time that you had responsibility over her
employment?
A Yes.
Q
Did you contemplate that she had been
performing any active guard duties when she
was asleep?
A

No.

Q
Did you contemplate that she would be
performing any active guard duties when she
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was at the University attending classes?
A

No.

Q
Did you contemplate that she would be
performing any active guard duties when she
was employed full time at another job?
A

No.

Q
In her exhibit that she gave to the
company, which I think is marked as P-12, she
indicates that's the total time that she
spent each week making her active guard
duties, amounting to about seven hours and 50
minutes. From your knowledge of her duties,
does that sound correct to you? Is it high
or low or how would you characterize her
estimate?
A
Well, it might be a little high, but I
couldn't say for certain.
*

*

*

Q Okay. All right. Now, knowing what you
know about her duties, can you tell the Court
how much time it would take over the course
of a week on the average to perform all of
the duties that she had to do?
A

Five, six hours.

Something like that.
*

*

*

Q Okay. Was Mrs. Sidwell ever instructed by
you that she had to remain awake during the
night to be on guard?
A

Never.

Q Was she free to come and go other than the
one round a day and two rounds on weekends
that you say she was asked to perform?
A Yes.
Q
And did she in fact come and go as she
pleased?
A Yes.
20

(Mrs. Sidwell's Testimony, Tr. 183, 221-22)
Q
[by Merkling] Why aren't you making a
claim for those hours then?
A Because I was told by Mr. Darrell Williams
when he gave me my job description that I
would not be responsible for security duties
or even for my presence on Saturday morning
until 11:45.
Q

How about the weekdays?

A On the weekdays, Mr. Darrell Williams, as
I stated, told me that I was perfectly free
to get myself a daytime job because it was
very evident—
Q

Well —

A
Okay.
That I was very free to get a
daytime job, then.
*

*

*

Q
[by Kennedy] Mrs. Sidwell, did you, did
you include in the hours that you've listed
here as hours worked [for compensation], time
that you spent that you were actually asleep?
A

Yes, Mr. Kennedy.

Q And you also included time where you were,
maybe, eating dinner?
A

Yes, Mr. Kennedy.

Q
And maybe over the weekends, when you
eating lunch?
A

Yes, Mr. Kennedy.

Q

And other meals?

A Yes.
Q You also included the time that you spent
preparing meals?
A

Yes, Mr. Kennedy.
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Q You included time that you spent attending
to other personal matters; for example,
taking a bath or shower?
A

Yes, Mr. Kennedy.

Q
You included time that you spent even,
maybe, running some errands?
A

Yes, Mr. Kennedy.

Q
And you included
attending church?
A

time

that

you spent

Yes, Mr. Kennedy.

Q
And you included time
attending the symphony?

that you spent

A Yes.
*

*

*

Q Did you include the time that you spent
studying for these classes that you attended?
A

Yes, Mr. Kennedy.

Q In fact, really, you've included time for
a variety of matters where you were pursuing,
oh, one personal interest or another in this
time?
A

I was living there, Mr. Kennedy.

Q
I understand.
havenf t you?
A

But you included that,

Yes, I have.

(Testimony of another Foreman, Jann Vasey, Tr. 245-46, 250,
261-62, 266)
Q [by Kennedy] During that period of time
[day in and day out basis], were you working
in a position where you could see what was
happening on the premises there at the site?
A

Yes, I was.

Q
Did you ever see Mrs. Sidwell make any
rounds during that period of time?
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A

No, I did not.

Q
You became her supervisor in May of 1 9 —
let me ask you# did that bother you at all?
A

No.

Q

Why not?

A To the best of my knowledge she just lived
there and could come and go as she pleased.
Q You became her supervisor in May of 1985,
approximately?
A

Yes.

Q And at that time did you change her duties
in any way?
A

No, I did not.

Q
Did you observe whether she made
rounds
at
all
after
you
became
supervisor?
A

any
her

No, I did not.
*

*

*

Q
Did it upset you that she wasn't there
when you called to have her shut the pump
off?
A

No, not at all.

Q

Why not?

A
Well, she just lived there.
come and go as she pleased.

She could

Q
Now, did you ever criticize her for not
being there under these circumstances?
A

No, I did not.
*

*

*

Q
When she became a concern of yours, did
you keep any records of when she was or
wasn't there?
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A

No, I did not.

Q

Why not?

A
I wasn't that worried about her comings
and goings.
Q Did you ever restrict her in any way with
respect to her comings and goings?
A

No, I did not.
*

*

*

Q Did you ever indicate to Mrs. Sidwell she
had to get permission in order to leave?
A

No, I did not.

Q So, on her own she called you and said I'm
going to be gone?
A

That is correct.

The final segment of Mr. Vasey's testimony, quoted above,
was

omitted

from

Sidwell!s

Brief,

which

referred

questions from the Court immediately preceding it.

to

some

On the basis

of the partial quotation, Appellant suggested an inconsistency in
Mr.

Vasey's

inconsistency,

recollection.
however,

(Brief

disappears

p.
when

23.)

That

alleged

Mr. Vasey's

complete

statement is considered.
Consequently, the Findings of the Trial Court are supported
by

substantial

inadequate

and

attempts

competent
by

evidence

Sidwell's

Brief

in

the

record.

to question

The

a small

selection of those Findings cannot serve as cause for this Court
on review to reject those Findings.
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B.

The Credibility of Mrs. Sidwellfs
Testimony Was Called into Serious Question.

In addition

to the overwhelming

weight

of

the evidence

supporting the Trial Courtfs Findings, it must be noted that the
Appellant's main witness (herself) was shown to be unreliable and
not

credible.

The

following

passage

from

the

Transcript

demonstrates these points:
THE COURT: Wait a minute. He [Mr. Kennedy]
just asked you a very simple question. Was
that the question and the answer on that day
[when your deposition was taken]?
THE WITNESS:
Kennedy.
THE COURT:

This

is what

I said, Mr.

Thank you.

THE WITNESS:
to hold to.

This is not what I am willing

In addition to such evasive and equivocating testimony, the
Trial Court also heard the admission from Mrs. Sidwell and her
attorney

that

she

had

been

convicted

property from a prior employer.

of a crime, theft of

(Tr. 208)

That evidence had

been brought to light by Monroe to impeach the credibility of
Mrs. Sidwell under the rules of evidence.
Hence, the Trial Court had more than an adequate basis for
rejecting all of the contentions asserted by Mrs. Sidwell.
simply was not a credible witness.
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She

C.

Under Accepted Standards of Review, the
Appellant Sidwell Failed to Meet her Burden
To Challenge the Trial Court's Findings of
Fact.

The Utah Supreme Court and this Court have recently and
repeatedly restated the standard for appellate review of Findings
of Fact.

That standard

is that a reviewing court will not

overturn a trial Judgefs Findings of Fact unless such Findings
are clearly erroneous.

In viewing the evidence, the reviewing

court must be left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.
Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (1987).

Ball v. Volken, 741 P. 2d 974, 64

Findings are presumed valid and correct

as long as there is sufficient support for them in the evidence.
Crimson v. Western Company, 742 P.2d 1219, 65 Utah Adv. Rep. 26
(Ct. App. 1987).

A heavy burden rests upon the Appellant to

marshal the evidence supporting the Trial Court's Findings and
then to demonstrate that such evidence, when compared to the
contrary evidence, is so lacking as to warrant the conclusion
that clear error has been committed.
Utah

Ap.

Rep.

32

(1987).

This

Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 69

Court

has

stated

that

the

Appellant is required to marshal all of the evidence supporting
the Trial Judge's Findings. This requirement is neither elective
nor optional.
Appellant.
App. 1987).

Nor will the reviewing court perform this task for

Fitzgerald v. Crltchfield, 67 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Ct.
To mount a successful attack on the Trial Court's

Findings of Fact, Appellant must marshal all the evidence in
support of the Trial Court's Findings and then demonstrate that
even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below,
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the evidence is insufficient to support the Findings.

Id.

The Fitzgerald case held that it was insufficient for an
appellant simply to compare one party's version of the facts with
the other party's version.
Utah

Adv.

appellate

Rep.

44

review

In Hansen v. Green River Group, 74

(Ct. App.

is

1988),

"strictly

this

limited"

Court

ruled

concerning

that

factual

findings relating to the parties' intent as it pertains to an
agreement.
competent
appeal.

Those
evidence

findings,
in

if

supported

the record, will

not

by

substantial,

be disturbed

on

See, Wilburn v. Interstate Elec, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. 23

(Ct. App. 1988)

This Court also very recently stated in Gillmor

v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 68 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Ct. App. 1987),
that the Court presumes the Findings of Fact of the Trial Court
to be correct.

It is not the function of the Appellate Court to

make Findings of Fact because it does not have the advantage of
seeing and hearing witnesses testify.

On review, this Court

views the evidence and all the references that can reasonably be
drawn therefrom in a light most supportive of the Trial Court's
Findings.

If there is a reasonable basis in evidence, the Trial

Court will be affirmed on appeal.

Even where there is disparity

in issue, the Trial Court's Findings will not be set aside unless
the strict standard and requirements placed upon the Appellant
have been satisfied.

See Davies v. Olson, 746 P. 2d 264, 70 Utah

Adv. Rep. 42 (Ct. App. 1987); Salt Lake City School Dist. v.
Galbraith & Green, 740 P.2d 284, 62 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Ct. App.
1987)

(It is not for the Court to substitute its judgment for
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that of the Trial Court).
And see Circle Airfreight v. Boyce Equipment, 74 745 P.2d
828,

69 Adv. Rep. 39

(Ct. App.

1987), which held

that the

reviewing Court must give due regard to the opportunity of the
Trial Court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and the
Trial Court's Findings, if not against the clear weight of the
evidence and not clearly erroneous, should not be disturbed on
appeal.
In light of the foregoing rules which apply to this case, it
is clear that the Appellant has failed to meet her burden to
challenge the Trial Court's Findings.

A review of Appellant's

Brief reveals that Sidwell has completely failed even to attempt
to

marshal

Findings.

the

evidence

which

supports

the

Trial

Court's

In the foregoing portion of this Brief, Respondent

Monroe has set forth some of the evidence which supports the
Trial Court's Findings, but, as indicated in the Newmeyer and
Fitzgerald

cases, cited

above,

this burden

is a requirement

placed upon the Appellant, not the Respondent.

Sidwell!s failure

to meet that burden is a fatal flaw in her appeal.

On that basis

alone, her appeal must be rejected.
Monroe submits that the reason why Appellant Sidwell has
failed

to marshal

the evidence

supporting

the Trial

Court's

Findings is that if Sidwell had done so, the overwhelming support
of

the

evidence

would

become

apparent.

Instead,

Appellant

Sidwell's has mischaracterizect the evidence and those Findings
and then has attempted to attack the Findings on the basis of
28

inconsistencies which do not exist.
is

substantial

and

competent

As demonstrated above, there

evidence

in

the

Record

which

supports each Finding of the Trial Court.
Certainly,

viewing

all

the

evidence

in

the

light most

supportive of the Trial Court's Findings, no rationale exists for
disturbing those Findings.

This is especially true in this case

where the Trial Court's Findings are based in large part upon the
testimony of witnesses whose demeanor on the stand was directly
observed

by the Trial Court, and where the Appellant's main

witness' credibility was cast into serious question.
In summary, Appellant Sidwell has not met even the threshold
test for challenging the Findings of the Trial Court.

Moreover,

Respondent Monroe (even though it does not have a burden to do so
at this point) has demonstrated that those Findings are indeed
supported by substantial competent evidence.

II.

AMPLE LEGAL PRECEDENT EXISTS WHICH SUPPORTS THE
FLSA DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN THIS CASE.

Monroe does not dispute the fact that the FLSA requires an
employer to pay an employee minimum wage ($3.35 per hour) for all
hours worked, nor does Monroe dispute that the law requires that
time and one-half must be paid for hours worked in excess of
forty in any one week.
before

the Trial

In this case, however, the question

Court was how many hours did Mrs. Sidwell

actually work in any given week?

Given the facts as found by the

Trial Court, which were supported by substantial evidence in the
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Record, the Trial Court properly applied the law in light of
established precedents to determine that Monroe had correctly
paid Mrs. Sidwell.
It should

be emphasized

that

Sidwell's

appeal

is based

entirely upon the erroneous premise that the Findings of the
Trial Court are invalid.

Nothing in Sidwell's Brief indicates

that, if the Trial Court's Findings are indeed correct (which
they

are)

the

appeal would

nonetheless

have merit.

Hence,

because those Findings are indeed correct, Sidwell1s appeal must
fail.
Regardless
Sidwell

of

regarding

the

unsupported

the

Trial

contentions

Court's

of

Appellant

Findings,

there

are

sufficient undisputed facts which would nevertheless support the
lower

court's

decision.

For

example,

Sidwell's

proposed

Supplemental Findings of Fact (R. 208-11) admit that Mrs. Sidwell
was expected to deal with trespassing after operating hours; that
she was paid $355.00 per month; that her "active guard duties"
totalled only seven hours and 50 minutes each week; that during
the normal operating hours of the plant, she was completely free
to pursue her own individual interests, including accepting fulltime employment with another employer and engaging in normal,
private

pursuits

with

complete

freedom

from

all

duties and

responsibilities; that she was free to attend classes at the
university and go to the symphony, etc.
In light of such undisputed facts, legal authority supports
the

decision

of

the

Trial

Court.
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The

federal

regulation

applicable

to

this

situation

is

29

C.F.R.

§785.23, which

provides:
Employees residing on employer's premises or working at
home.
An employee who resides on his employer's premises
on a permanent basis or for extended periods of time is
not considered as working all the time he is on the
premises. Ordinarily, he may engage in normal private
pursuits and thus have enough time for eating,
sleeping, entertaining, and other periods of complete
freedom from all duties when he may leave the premises
for purposes of his own. It is of course difficult to
determine
the exact
hours worked under these
circumstances and any reasonable agreement of the
parties which takes into consideration all of the
pertinent facts will be accepted.
This rule would
apply, for example, to the pumper of a stripper well
who resides on the premises of his employer and also to
a telephone operator who has the switchboard in her own
home.
(Skelly Oil Co. v. Jackson, 194 Okla. 183, 148
P. 2d 182 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1944); Thompson v. Loring Oil
Co.. 50 F. Supp. 213 (W.D. La. 1943) [Emphasis added.]
Pursuant to the foregoing regulation, if Monroe and Mrs.
Sidwell had a reasonable agreement regarding the conditions under
which she would be compensated for the time she actually worked
while living on the Monroe premises, such agreement would not be
upset.

In this case, the facts showed that such an agreement did

exist:

Monroe agreed to pay Mrs. Sidwell $355.00 per month plus

furnish the space and utilities for her trailer (Tr. 154)

(which

utilities and space were worth a total of $123.00 additional
compensation each month, Findings 18 and 19, Tr. 96, Ex. P-16) .
The gross pay for Mrs. Sidwell of $478.00 each month was paid for
active guard duties of between eight and ten hours per week
(Finding 11). By simple mathematics, this means that Mrs. Sidwell
was actually paid at least $11.03 per hour worked
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(12 months

times $478, divided by 10 hours times 52 weeks).
the

support

of

the above-cited

regulation,

In addition to

established

case

precedent also supports the Trial Courtfs determination in this
instance.

For example, in Adklns v. Campbell Brown & Co., 189 F.

Supp., 41 Labor Cases Par. 31,055 (S. D. W. Va. 1960), it was
held

that

employer

time spent
in

the

by an employee

performance

of

a

on the property of an
guard

function

did

not

constitute working time within the coverage of the FLSA, where
the terms of the arrangement provided for the establishment of
living quarters on the employer's property and for the guard to
be seen about the property two or three times after operations
had closed for the day in return for free living quarters, gas
and electricity, pay at the rate of fifty dollars a month and
enough odd jobs at the rate of one dollar per hour to bring his
weekly earnings up to thirty-five or forty dollars per week.
Although the presence of the guard on the employer's property in
Adkins was intended as a precaution against vandalism, the time
spent was not controlled by the employer and was found to be
predominantly

for

the

individual's

own benefit.

Under such

circumstances, which are quite similar to those admitted to have
existed here, the court in Adkins found no violation of the FLSA.
See also, Skelly Oil Co. v. Jackson, 8 Labor Cases Par. 61. 133,
148 P.2d 182 (Okla. 1944).
result was reached.
Cases Par. 60,807

In another similar case, the same

Cordell v. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co., 5 Labor
(D. Okla. 1941).

In that situation, the

employee was a "pumper" on an oil well property.
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The court

stated:
A pumper on an oil well property usually lives in
a house on the lease furnished by the oil company, and
it is necessary that he spend almost all of his time on
the lease in case something happens to the pumps;
however, the testimony in this case shows that the
pumper left the lease often to go to town, buy his
groceries, take his children to school, etc.
*

*

*

Of course, all of these pumpers are required to be
available on the lease for some period of time during
the day other than the time during which they are
actually required to perform some service for the
employer. It is necessary for them to be available to
take care of any breakdowns and attend to any trouble
that might develop in connection with the pumping of a
well. But I don't thing the law contemplates that an
employee is to be compensated for all the time that he
is reguired to be available there on the lease for work
in the event something should develop that would
reguire his attention. [Emphasis added.]
The same conclusion was reached in Perry v. George P. Livermore,
Inc. , 6 Labor Cases Par. 61,310 (Ct. App. Tex. 1942), which was
another oil lease case.

In that decision, the court stated:

In harmony with the opinion of the [Wage and Hour]
Administrator, as above expressed, we do not think it
was contemplated by the Congress that such an employee
as we have in this case should be compensated for the
time he spent in sleeping, eating, relaxing, or
otherwise engaging in entirely private pursuits, either
on or off the premises of his employer.
[Emphasis
added.]
The opinion referred to in the foregoing passage appeared as
Interpretative Bulletin No. 13:
In some cases employees are engaged in active work
for part of the day but because of the nature of the
job are also required to be on call for 24 hours a day.
Thus, for example, a pumper of a stripper well often
resides on the premises of his employer.
The pumper
engages in oiling the pump each day and doing any other
necessary work around the well. In the event that the
pump stops (at any time during the day or night) the
pumper must start it up again. Similarly, caretakers,
custodians, or watchmen of lumber camps during the off
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season when the camp is closed, live on the premises of
the employer, have a regular routine of duty, but are
subject to call at any time in the event of an
emergency. The fact that the employee makes his home
at his employer's place of business in these cases does
not mean that the employee is necessarily working 24
hours a day.
In the ordinary course of events, the
employee has a normal night's sleep, has ample time in
which to eat his meals and has a certain amount of time
for relaxation and entirely private pursuits. In some
cases the employee may be free to come and go during
certain periods.
Thus, here again the facts may
justify the conclusion that the employee is not working
at all times during which he is subject to call in the
event of an emergency, and a reasonable computation of
working hours in this situation will be accepted by the
Division. [Emphasis added.]
Here, as under the example cited in the Opinion, it was
undisputed that Mrs. Sidwell in the ordinary course of events was
able to have a normal night's sleep, eat her meals, relax, and
enjoy

private

pursuits.

Another

case

reaching

a

similar

conclusion that not all the time in question should constitute
working time is Brennan v. Williams Investment Co., Inc., 77
Labor Cases Par. 33,254 (W.D. Tenn. 1975).

See also, Wage and

Hour Opinion Letter No. 600 (May 25, 1967), ruling that employees
residing on the employer's premises, such as house mothers in the
women's

dormitories

of

colleges

or

universities,

are

not

considered as working all the time while on the premises;

and

see Wage and Hour Opinion Letter No. 783 (April 1, 1968).
The foregoing authorities demonstrate that virtually since
the

passage

of

the

FLSA,

the

Agency

and

the

courts

have

considered that employees who reside on the employer's premises
are not
presence.

to be regarded as working

the entire time of their

In the present situation, which is factually very
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similar to the example cited in the available precedent, Mrs.
Sidwell was found to be engaged in "active guard duties" only for
eight to ten hours per week.

Under those circumstances, the

arrangement agreed upon between Monroe and Sidwell was certainly
reasonable and should not be upset.
The cases cited in Sidwell's Brief are not applicable here.
For example, Witt v. Skellv Oil Co. , 379 P.2d 61 (N.M. 1963),
does not apply in this instance because the employee in that case
was required to be on the premises during the entire weekend.
Mrs.

Sidwell,

in

contrast,

throughout the weekend.

was

not

required

to be present

Her duties consisted of only two rounds

each weekend day (see Finding 6). At the same time, she was free
on weekends to attend church, go to the symphony, and to come and
go as she pleased.

Similarly, the Craqo v. Rockwell Mfg. Co.,

301 F. Supp. 743 (D. Tenn. 1969), case also does not apply here.
Mrs. Sidwell can hardly be described

(as was the employee in

Crago) as a "captive on the employer's premises for sixteen hours
a day."

In Mrs. Sidwell's own words, she was engaged in "active

guard duties" only sever hours and 50 minutes each week (Ex. P12).

Likewise, Marshall v. Nauta-Crete, Ltd., 82 Labor Law Rep.

Par.

33,589 (D. Va. 1977), is not applicable because the two

guards

in

that

case were

required

to stay on

throughout the period of their service each weekend.

the premises
An entirely

different regulation applied in that case (29 C.F.R. §785.22,
entitled "Where an employee is required to be on duty for 24
hours or more").

Mrs. Sidwell was certainly not required to be
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on duty 24 hours or more during any particular period of time.
That was not her assignment, and even she doesn't claim that
Monroe imposed such a requirement upon her.
In anticipation of Monroe's Brief, Appellant attempts to
wipe away the cases cited to the Trial Court by Monroe and also
referred to above as supportive of the lower court's decision
(see Sidwell Brief, p. 32).

Appellant attempts to negate that

authority by the cryptic assertion that

"each of these cases

turns upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of employment.
No sweeping generalizations can be made.11

Despite the fact that

those cases were cited to the Trial Court by Monroe in support of
its decision, Appellant Sidwell makes no effort in her Brief to
attempt

to distinguish

the

facts of

present in the case at hand.

those cases

from

those

Monroe submits that the reason

Appellant fails to do so is because the facts of those case are
amazingly

similar

to

the present

distinguished on a factual basis.

ease and

simply

cannot

be

In addition, contrary to the

generalization that "no generalizations can be made," it can be
accurately stated that those cases to stand for several general
propositions:
for extended

Where employees reside on an employer's premises
periods of time, they are not considered

to be

working during all of such periods, particularly where they can
engage in normal private pursuits and thus have time for eating,
sleeping, entertaining, and enjoying other periods of complete
freedom from all duties when they can leave the premises.
Mrs.

Sidwell's

case,

as

the

Trial
36

Court

found,

based

In
upon

substantial evidence (including her own admissions), except for 8
to 10 hours per week, Mrs. Sidwell was not working for Monroe.
As stated above, similar cases applying the rules relating to
employees

who

reside

on

their

employers1

premises

and

are

generally free to come and go as they please, are not considered
working

during

such periods.

Those cases offer

significant

support to the Conclusions reached by the Trial Court in this
instance.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN HE FAILED TO TREBLE
MONROC'S DAMAGES FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
When the Trial Judge made his ruling on Monroe's request for
treble damages, his statements from the bench indicated that he
applied an incorrect rule of law in reaching his decision on this
issue.

His statement revealed that he believed that the statute

required only that waste and damages to the premises be trebled.
He equated rental payments owing before the notice of unlawful
detainer was served with rents owing after the notice was served
and

the tenancy was ended.

Monroe concedes that rent owing

before the notice of unlawful detainer is not to be trebled.
However, the reasonable value of the premises during the period
of the unlawful detainer must be trebled under the statute.
Judge Daniels1 comment on this issue appears in the Record
at page 302:
As I read the unlawful detainer statute, I don't
think you treble the rent. I know it's very ambiguous,
but I think it talks about awarding damages and
awarding rent, and I don't think you treble the rent.
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I think your treble damages that rises as a result of
the unlawful detainer, and particular waste or damage
that is done, so I'm not going to award treble damages
on the unlawful detainer action.
The Judge found that the notice of unlawful detainer was
served on April 17, 1986.
that date.

No rent is claimed by Monroe prior to

The Judge also found that the reasonable value of the

premises during the unlawful detainer was $50.00 per month and
that the unlawful detainer extended for six months.
to treble

the total

He refused

of six time fifty dollars, or $300.00.

R.302.
The leading case on this issue is Forrester v. Cook, 292
Pac. 206

(Utah 1930).

With respect

to the issue of treble

damages, that case presented an identical legal question to the
one considered by this Court in his Memorandum Decision dated
March 18, 1987.

The holding of the Utah Supreme Court suggests

that the Trial Court erred in reaching his conclusions in his
bench ruling, cited above.

It is appropriate that this Court now

correct that error.
The relevant portion of the Forrester case is quoted below
(see 292 Pac. 213-14):
The question may arise as to what is
included within the term "damages11 [under the
unlawful detainer statute]. It is contended
by defendants that the basis of the judgment
here is for rental value or reasonable rental
value of the use and occupation of the
premises and that this comes within the term
"rents" as used in the statute, rather than
"damages," and that rents cannot be trebled.
The statute itself indicates the meaning of
the terms wherein it says that the jury shall
"also assess the damages occasioned to the
plaintiff by any * * * unlawful detainer."
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The word "rent" has reference to "the amount
of any rent due, if the alleged unlawful
detainer be after the default in the payment
of rent." The rents here spoken of are rents
which accrued before default. In the present
action there are no rents accruing before
forfeiture.
The plaintiff is entitled to
recover such damages as are the natural and
proximate
consequences of the unlawful
detainer. Clearly the loss of the value of
the use and occupation of the premises, or
the rental value thereof during the period
when the premises were unlawfully withheld
from plaintiff, is a damage suffered here.
While damages may not be restricted to the
rental value and may include more, yet the
rental value during the unlawful withholding
of the premises is the minimum damages
[Citations omitted.] Rent, which may not be
trebled,
are
such
as
accrue
before
termination of the tenancy.
After the
tenancy has been terminated by the notice
required by the statute, the person in
unlawful possession is not owing rent under
the contract, but must respond in damages
pursuant to the law.
Rental value or
reasonable value of the use and occupation of
the premises becomes an element of damages
for retaining possession. This is not rent,
it is damages. [Emphasis added.]
Under

the

rule

of Forrester

as applied

to the present

factual situation, Mrs. Sidwell is liable for the rent due for
the period from April 17, 1986, to October 30, 1986.

The sums

due following the service of the unlawful detainer notice do
constitute "damages" incurred by Monroe and must be trebled under
the statute.
The Forrester decision has been consistently followed by the
Utah Supreme Court.

It has been cited as a clear statement of

the law on this point in Utah.
Ferrier,

567

P.2d

1102,

See, Lincoln Financial Corp. v.

1105

(Utah

1977);

Ute-Cal

Land

Development v. Intermountain Stock Exchange, 628 P.2d at 1282
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(Utah

1981).

Forrester

line

considered

as

Clearly, under Utah law as enunciated
of

cases,

"damages"

a

the

landlord

is

reasonable

entitled

rental

in the
to

value

have

of

the

unlawfully detained premises for the time following the service
of the unlawful detainer notice.
Hence, Conclusion of Law No. 11 should be amended to provide
that the damages incurred by reason of the unlawful detainer of
$300.00 should be trebled, to total $900.00.
Correspondingly,

Paragraph

1 of

the

Judgment

should

be

amended to read: "Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff and
against defendant in the amount of $900.00 as treble damages.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED
Appellant
burden

Sidwell has entirely

of marshalling

all

failed to meet her heavy

the evidence

sustaining

the Trial

Court's Findings and then overcoming the presumption in favor of
those

Findings

constitute

by

demonstrating

competent

substantial

why

that

evidence

evidence

does not

supporting

those

Findings when such evidence is viewed in the most favorable light
supporting those Findings.

In addition, Appellant Sidwell has

failed to show why, according to undisputed facts, the ruling of
the Trial Court concerning her FLSA claim should be altered.
Indeed, applicable case precedent more than justifies the Trial
Court's decision.
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On the other hand, the Trial Court was clearly in error when
he failed to treble the damages incurred by Monroe relating to
the value

of

the premises

following

the notice of unlawful

detainer.
On the basis of the foregoing and on the basis of the Record
as a whole, Respondent Monroe submits that the appeal of Sidwell
should be denied.

The ruling of the Trial Court with respect to

Mrs. Sidwellfs claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act should
be affirmed.

However, the ruling of the Trial Court with respect

to Monroe's claim for treble damages should be reversed and the
rule of the Forrester case, supra, should be applied, increasing
the amount of the Judgment against Mrs. Sidwell to $900.00.
Dated:

February 24, 1988.

Respectfully submitted,

( Jcftin Paul Kennedy
,\
VA^torney f o r Respondent Monroe
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CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing Brief of
Respondent Monroe was served upon the person named below at the
address indicated by personal delivery on the date stated.
Dated:

February 24, 1988.
Craig S. Cook
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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